What Are Some Of The Challenges To Treating Exotic Animals Particularly In Zoological Settings
Animals (Basel). 2019 Jun; 9(6): 318.
Dilemmas for Natural Living Concepts of Zoo Brute Welfare
Received 2019 April ix; Accepted 2019 Jun 3.
Abstract
Simple Summary
This upstanding discourse specifically deals with dilemmas encountered within zoological institutions, namely for the concept of natural living, and a new term—wilding. Wilding refers to extrapolation of the natural living concept to treating an creature as wild, residing in a wild habitat. The bug associated with wilding are detailed. Complexities of natural living versus natural aesthetics as judged by humans, too as the possibility of innate preference for naturalness within animals are examined. It is argued that unintended and unavoidable genetic and epigenetic drift favouring adaptations for life in a captive environs may still occur, despite zoos best efforts to preclude this from occurring. This commodity further discusses the blurred lines between natural and unnatural behaviours, and the overlaps with more of import highly-motivated behaviours, which may be better predictors of positive affective states in convict animals, and thus, better predictors of positive well-being and welfare. Finally, as we are at present in the Anthropocene era, it is suggested that human-animal interactions could really be considered natural in a way, and notwithstanding, be very important to animals that initiate these interactions, especially for "a life worth living".
Abstract
This ethical discourse specifically deals with dilemmas encountered inside zoological institutions, namely for the concept of natural living, and a new term—wilding. It is agreed past some that zoos are not ethically wrong in principle, merely there are currently some contradictions and ethical concerns for zoos in practice. Natural living is a complicated concept, facing multiple criticisms. Not all natural behaviours, nor natural environments, are to the benefit of animals in a captive setting, and practical application of the natural living concept has flaws. Expression of natural behaviours does non necessarily indicate positive well-existence of an animal. Herein it is suggested that highly-motivated behaviours may be a better term to properly explicate behaviours of more significance to convict animals. Wilding refers to extrapolation of the natural living concept to treating an animal as wild, residing in a wild habitat. This definition is intrinsically problematic, as quite literally by definition, captivity is not a wild nor natural environment. Treating a captive beast exactly the aforementioned as a wild analogue is practically impossible for many species in a few ways. This commodity discusses complexities of natural living versus natural aesthetics as judged by humans, equally well every bit the possibility of innate preference for naturalness within animals. Zoos nobly strive to keep wild animals every bit natural and undomesticated as possible. Here information technology is argued that unintended and unavoidable genetic and epigenetic drift favouring adaptations for life in a captive surround may still occur, despite our best efforts to prevent this from occurring. This article farther discusses the blurred lines between natural and unnatural behaviours, and the overlaps with more than of import highly-motivated behaviours, which may be amend predictors of positive affective states in captive animals, and thus, meliorate predictors of positive well-being and welfare. Finally, as we are now in the Anthropocene era, it is suggested that human being-animal interactions could actually be considered natural in a fashion, and nonetheless, exist very important to animals that initiate these interactions, especially for "a life worth living".
Keywords: animal ethics, natural living, wilding, zoo animals, human-animal interactions, animal welfare
i. Introduction
To preface this article, I would acknowledge and accost the implicit assumptions near animal welfare scientific discipline and philosophy that have brought us to the ethical position herein. I would refer the readers to other published articles which explore the history of brute welfare and ethics in much depth, as these are used as a basis for our understanding and arguments [one,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. This article specifically deals with competing ideals of optimal animal welfare within zoological institutions, namely concepts of natural living, and a new term—wilding. This discourse does not necessarily use to other convict animal industries such as farms or laboratories.
Equally other ethicists have written, I agree that zoos are not ethically wrong in principle, merely there are currently some contradictions and ethical concerns for zoos in do [v]. It should exist understood that I am a supporter of zoological institutions and their betterment, although I may disagree with some zoo practices, and between myself and other researchers in ethical views of the specific dilemmas herein. It is too acknowledged that zoos are not going away any time soon (see [5]), so it is the pragmatic duty of researchers and philosophers to work with zoos constructively. I would too like to admit the positions of other researchers in the field, such equally Weary and Robbins [9], and Yeates [10]. This commodity is not intended as a refutation of these other contempo articles nearly natural living and holistic welfare, but rather to present an alternating conception of i part of overall animal welfare that may accept been misconstrued in certain zoo environments, leading to in practise incongruence and dilemmas. I admit that my arguments are formulated from my moral and upstanding position that humans have an obligation for special protection of captive animals, peculiarly zoo animals, and I subscribe to many (but non all) elements of compassionate conservation ethical theory of gimmicky philosophers such as Bekoff [11] and Greyness [12] over purely commonsensical or consequentialist approaches. At the moment compassionate conservation remains very anti-zoo in its position, however, equally Gray [12] posits, in that location is much merit in using this ethic to work with zoos constructively, to raise zoos' ethics and practices.
I acknowledge the currently accustomed bookish focus on the three conceptual frameworks (orientations) of animal welfare: biological functioning, affective states, and natural living [two,13]. This is how the science of animal welfare is commonly taught to undergraduate and postgraduate learners in our discipline. Information technology is acknowledged, all the same, that this not the just way to conceptualise the entire picture of convict animal welfare [3,9], and that these three conceptual frameworks do not embrace all relevant information in all situations. I acknowledge that a predominant model for characterising and assessing good welfare, peculiarly inside zoos, is the Five Domains Model of Mellor and Reid [14] and Mellor and Beausoleil [fifteen]. Whilst incorporating pluralistic scientific elements of welfare, at its core the V Domains Model assumes a hedonistic priority of animal welfare, that is, what the beast feels about its life and environment is the nearly important gene in holistic welfare. In this commodity a pluralistic footing of welfare is acknowledged, though for the sake of argument a hedonistic basis is prioritised. It is understood, yet, that a hedonistic priority also misses some of the whole moving-picture show [three]; hedonism-based welfare conceptions are not dogma. The 2 scientific concepts of biological functioning and affective states volition but be touched on in this article, equally my primary focus is to shine a light on how the concept of natural living may have been pushed by its useful bounds in zoo situations.
Information technology should be stated that whilst hedonistic conceptions of welfare are more often than not concerned with "how the lives of sentient animals are going, for the sake of, and from the perspective of, the animals themselves" [6], it is strongly suggested here that (every bit written by Weary and Robbins [ix]) relationships matter. That is, non merely are the self-derived internal states of the individual highly important, only also those emotion-inducing relationships that are of import to the individual—such equally relationships to conspecifics, other animals, and humans including carers and visitors—and some relationships that others have with that private may besides be important to welfare outcomes (for example, the specific values and attitudes a person holds will affect their relationship with an individual animal, and reinforcers to this relationship create a bi-directional, perpetual feedback loop). These relationships may then exist reflected by the internal melancholia states of both (or all) agents in that interaction [16,17]. This has been characterised past the general Hemsworth-Coleman model of man-fauna interactions [xviii,19]. The general model has been specifically adapted for zoo visitor-animal relationships [xx], pictured beneath (Effigy ane). A very similar model has been proposed for zookeeper-creature interactions also [20]. Human values and attitudes towards animals, and the relationships formed betwixt them, can strongly influence subjective (hedonistic) experiences of welfare.
2. Natural Living
Natural living is a (sometimes) useful fundamental concept in the assessment of animate being welfare, often defined as "providing opportunities for animals to engage in natural, species-specific behaviours" [1,two,10]. As a concept, it suggests that animals' well-being may be considerably improved if they are able to perform species-specific behaviours from their natural repertoire, peculiarly innate behaviours. In practice, this has often been accomplished by removing restrictions to these behaviours (whether they are physical or ecology restrictions) and by providing appropriate objects, resources or enclosures with/in which to perform the behaviour(s). Often, definitions of the concept besides include phrases nigh housing animals in natural environments. However, not all natural behaviours, nor natural environments, are to the benefit of animals in a captive setting, and practical awarding of the concept has many flaws. A main criticism of the apply of natural living has been that "the concept of natural is usually as well poorly defined to provide a audio basis for brute welfare assessment, and thus when applied uncritically it may lead to poorer welfare instead of an improvement" [21]. This criticism has been expressed quite commonly in the past few decades [ane,2,10,nineteen,22].
Joint of the concept, and its transposition to practical application in many captive settings accept somewhat missed the indicate entirely. Natural behaviour, natural living and naturalness are poorly-defined key terms that are as well often conflated with other concepts and measures of an animal's overall well-being, such as feelings (melancholia state) or office (biological functioning) [10]. Expression of natural behaviours does not necessarily indicate positive well-being of an animal; likewise absence of some natural behaviours does not necessarily indicate suffering [23,24]. Nor should the term natural behaviour be used when really referring to other conceptual types of behaviours, such every bit highly-motivated behaviours, which may be natural or unnatural, however there is often meaning overlap between these 2 terms. Herein I will advise that highly-motivated behaviours may exist a meliorate term to properly explain behaviours of more significance to captive animals, and hash out where boundaries betwixt harmless and harmful highly-motivated behaviours may lie (as we still have an ethical obligation to protect animals from harming themselves, whether intentionally or accidentally, in captivity).
3. Wilding: The Natural Living Dilemma
Natural living has been a useful tool for improving welfare, but its practical application, especially within zoos, has been extended beyond its theoretical usefulness, and in many instances has been misinterpreted every bit what I will herein refer to as wilding. Wilding is a new term created to refer to extrapolation of the natural living concept to treating an fauna as wild, residing in a wild habitat. Wild here refers to "living or growing in the natural environment; not domesticated or cultivated" [25]. From a decade of first-paw experience within the zoo industry, this wilding conception of natural living has been encountered often enough to be considered pervasive amongst many zoo personnel'southward implicit beliefs and taught cognition about how zoos should approach animal welfare, though actual prevalence rates have not been systematically investigated. Indeed, many welfare assessment and monitoring tools deployed by zoos focus somewhat on natural environments and natural behaviours [26]. This wilding conception is intrinsically problematic for whatsoever captive animal manufacture (specially zoos) as, quite literally by definition, captivity is not a wild nor natural environment [27]. To place a wild creature in an bogus environment (no matter how accurate a recreation of a natural setting) and even so presume to care for it exactly the same as a wild counterpart is practically impossible for many creature species, in a few obvious means.
Firstly, truly wild animals in nature are non treated past humans in a detail way—they are not under the direct care of humans, however, they may nonetheless be influenced by humans [28]. These wildlife may be exposed to humans in multiple situations, and fifty-fifty have interactions with humans, merely their lives are not solely dictated by humans as captors/guardians. This does not preclude the possibility of interactions (both positive and negative) or conflicts arising betwixt humans and animals, animals venturing into "human spaces", or inroad of humans into an fauna's native infinite [28]. Yet, as soon as an brute is placed in captivity, no matter how wild its behaviours or instincts, its care (and indeed its survival) is and so determined and controlled by those humans that placed it there. A person cannot place an animal in a convict surroundings then refrain from providing basic cares or resources (such every bit food, water and shelter), and yet expect the animal to survive, let alone to thrive. Even in a highly accurate recreation of a natural environment, those basic resources must nevertheless be provided by the controlling humans—that is, the environment has been created and curated to provide those resource for the animal, through natural or artificial structures.
Secondly, even if information technology were the case that humans could provide a perfect replica of an animal'south wild environment with wild conditions, would it be morally or ethically permissible? Would it be (morally) right? Forgetting for a 2d that this perfect replica would nonetheless have been synthetic upon another natural or wild environment (thereby destroying a natural habitat and causing displacement of many native species), if truly a replica of natural conditions, then the animals placed in this environment would be subject to both the boons and significant hardships of nature. Nature is often bountiful and has allowed the rise of an amazingly diverse array of living beings, but has also borne witness to countless extinctions and ecological changes. Wildlife oft must endure very harsh weather to survive—atmospheric condition that considerately pb to periods of very poor welfare, when measured through scientific welfare concepts (biological functioning and affective states) [10,28,29,30]. Inclement weather condition and natural disasters such as droughts, fires or floods, are all common occurrences in nature. Animals must suffer a lack of shelter, food or water in many areas; they must avoid predation, injury, and disease; they may experience miscarriages, offspring mortalities or reproductive issues; they often have to compete with other animals (both of their own and other species) for access to resources; and they accept to navigate oftentimes-unfair social interactions and hierarchies. Frequently, living in nature leads to prolonged suffering and ends in premature death for individuals.
Many wild-type or natural behaviours are likewise maladaptive in a convict surround (such as fratricide or infanticide for extreme examples; to significant inbreeding in closed populations; group ostracism of certain individuals; or unfulfillable migratory behaviours/motivations) [12,30,31]. Thus, if it was indeed the objective of captive animal industries, such every bit zoos, to perfectly replicate natural environments so their animals may live wildly, it follows that all of the hardships of nature would also occur, or would have to be imposed. This is not a tenable upstanding position that any zoo organisation is known to advocate. Instead, natural recreations of wild environments in zoos endeavor to focus mainly on positive elements of nature, without imposition of events or states that may significantly diminish the animal's well-being [v,26,30,32]. Ethically, 1 will not find much (or any) opposition to this fashion of handling of the captive animals. This besides provides a pro-captivity argument against some anti-captivity, fauna liberty-based philosophies—captivity does indeed curtail some freedom of the convict brute, but information technology also provides solace and shelter from pregnant welfare-affecting hardships, which may exist peculiarly of benefit to those animals whom are most vulnerable to suffering. Indeed, if captivity is providing all of the needs and wants of an animate being (including positive affective experiences), simply without liberty, then liberty is non necessarily a basic involvement of the animate being [5]. Zoos are ofttimes the final breastwork of hope for many endangered species, as their wild homes have been irreparably damaged or overtaken by ever-expanding human populations [12,28,30,33]. This is an ever more salient betoken after the Un Intergovernmental Scientific discipline-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) released a 2019 report which estimates that anthropogenic influences may cause the extinction of ane meg species of animals and plants [33].
Information technology should be noted that whilst zoos tend to focus more often than not on recreating positive elements of nature and reducing negative circumstances, many zoos as well understand the impossibility of complete elimination of all negative circumstances, events, or negative feelings within an animal. In fact, many zoos will impose slight negative circumstances if it is believed that they may be of benefit to the animals' health, fitness, or experience of life [34]. That is, harmless or minimally harmful negative circumstances are sometimes imposed to increment stress resilience and/or physiological arousal of an animal [35,36]. For example, information technology has been reported that reliably signalling startling husbandry events can improve stress resilience and welfare of zoo-housed capuchins (Sapajus apella), whilst still leading to physiological arousal within the animals [37]. However, where is the distinction fatigued between harmless, minimally harmful and very harmful negatives? And who makes these categorical judgements?
Through collaborative practices shared between many zoos, a few mutual circumstances for imposing minimally harmful negative events include: rotational predator-casualty housing (where predatory species and prey species are rotated into the same enclosure at dissever times); predator-prey next housing with visual proximity; olfactory proximity between predator-prey species or ascendant-subordinate species (sometimes in the course of "enrichment", like adding predator bedding material to a casualty enclosure); or auditory proximity between predator-prey species (such as housing prey species within earshot of vocalising predators or dominant species, or playing recorded audio of predator/dominant fauna vocalisations near prey/subordinate species) [26,31]. These circumstances are thought to confer some resilience to animals through arousal of certain fear and vigilance responses, which can have a wide range of beneficial physiological effects, if non experienced for prolonged periods (astute stressors versus chronic stressors) [35,36]. Therefore, some mild harms are actually of high instrumental value within a captive environment. However, at that place should exist a trepidation of pushing such stress responses besides far in prey species, or causing inadvertent frustrations to these animals, for example in adjacent predator-prey housing where predators tin can visually run into casualty in very shut proximity, but non really reach them. Repeated frustration of consummatory outcomes may lead to development of negative melancholia states, equally indicated by frustration-blazon behaviours [24,34]. More bear witness is needed of the overall furnishings of the imposition of these stressors on private animals, to ensure that the intended arousal and stress resilience is beingness accomplished whilst fugitive unintended frustrations or development of negative affective states in these animals.
4. Natural Living, or But Natural Looking?
Erstwhile, when considering and implementing positive natural enclosures, zoos may tend to focus only on those that, aesthetically, lead people to believe that the surroundings is natural. For instance, lush constitute-life (or well-designed arid/desert habitats), water features, painted backdrops or "mock-stone" walls, absence of bogus structures, and/or limiting contact with visitors (or even staff/keepers) whether the limitations are visual, tactile or proximal. Much of the time, considerations of what is aesthetically pleasing may eclipse considerations of what is functional and advisable, with respect to bear witness-based practices [31]. More than just looking natural, zoo animals' enclosures must be able to provide necessary features and structures to allow animals to display a range of important behaviours, provide admission to perform positive husbandry practices, and allow ease-of-access for emergency procedures to be adhered to (for both brute emergencies, and other visitor or human emergency situations which may occur). If a natural wait is considered forefront, this may pb to functional inadequacies in many enclosures. Sometimes bogus structures in enclosures may be more appropriate to facilitate specific animate being behaviours—whereas natural structures may weaken, deteriorate or interruption (such equally tree branches or vines), suitable bogus replacements may provide the necessary environment for the behaviour and be a considerably more durable, sturdy or clean provision, which would require far less maintenance (and therefore budgetary cost). Every bit is condign apparent in novel affective state inquiry, interactions with humans may actually be beneficial and rewarding for some zoo-housed species in some situations [38,39,40,41]. If a zoo is too focused on wilding their animals, opportunities to truly provide the all-time positive welfare weather condition for the captive animals may be missed or ignored. Therefore, mixed natural/artificial enclosures for animals in zoos, that consider role, aesthetics, appropriate contact with humans, and practicality, may be much more plumbing equipment than the natural-just enclosures of the recent by. Two questions we might enquire ourselves of mixed natural-artificial environments are as follows:
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Does the animal have the chapters to know that the environment is (partly) artificial?
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Does the animal care if the environs is (partly) bogus?
These are open-ended questions that might be addressed in a split up paper, drawing from current knowledge of animal neurobiology and cognition, and their needs and wants for a "life worth living" [iv,42]. There is some prove that some species practice indeed display an innate preference for naturalistic "enriched" enclosures as opposed to basic artificial environments without many features (barren environments) (Box Turtles [43,44]; Coal tits and blueish tits [45]), suggesting that some animals may indeed have a chapters to place natural environments. Alternatively, perhaps they just innately prefer non-barren, enriched environments—perhaps these animals would be just every bit likely to select enriched artificial environments over any basic or barren environments. Utilising current animal welfare research and adept consensus a new era of evidence-based enclosure design, natural or not, which consider the animals' needs foremost, should be the adjacent footstep forward for zoo institutions [46]. As will exist explored later, unnatural or artificial environments can still be compatible with promoting the expression of natural behaviours.
A dilemma with wilding, and then, is that attempts to care for captive animals as wild are partly or wholly incongruent with their bodily situation. As has been said in this article earlier, captive animals are not, nor will they be, wild animals living in a wild surroundings. Their living environment is completely curated by humans, who must make many decisions for the animals for their best interests. This does not mean that we should try to treat all captive animals as nosotros would extensively domesticated animals such as livestock or companion animals (i.e., dogs and cats). Zoos indeed strive to keep their wild fauna as "undomesticated" as possible [12]. This, yet, may be an unattainable platonic, due to unintended and unavoidable genetic and epigenetic drifts favouring adaptations for life in a captive environment, despite our all-time efforts to otherwise forestall this from occurring. Indeed, in a human-animal interaction review affiliate, Hemsworth et al. [eighteen] write near the possibility of unintended domestication in zoos, citing inquiry such as Toll [47,48]—"While zoo animals are generally not considered to be domestic animals, domestication tin patently occur with wild fauna kept and bred in captivity, such as zoos, but the extent of the domestication process will depend on the charge per unit of bogus pick" [18]. The chapter also highlights the distinction between domestication of a group of animals, and taming of an private animal—domestication can be defined as "a process by which a population of animals becomes adjusted to man and to the captive environment past genetic changes occurring over generations and environmentally induced developmental events reoccurring during each generation" [48]; whereas taming is simply "an experiential (learning) miracle occurring during the lifetime of an individual animal" [47]. Domestication is a procedure near likely to happen to animals that are purposefully kept in captivity, and artificially bred or selected, or genetically altered, past humans. Individual taming may more often occur in both captive and wildlife that are in regular contact with humans.
To unpack this, nosotros should consider other historical animal domestications. The domestication process has taken thousands of years for those animals that we now consider domesticated. In that time, these animals have been subject to multiple selective pressures including artificially imposed selective breeding, turning them from a "wild-variant" into domesticated animals, specifically chosen for their desirable adaptations. A strong argument against the concept of natural living for these domesticated animals, therefore, is that these animals don't actually represent or reverberate any animate being which may be found in the wild or in nature [10]. They accept transformed into animals that don't fill any natural ecological niche, whose existence is solely reliant upon human intervention and care, and their persistence is reliant upon humans' continual propagation of that lineage. Of course, if all human interference or interaction were to end, these "unnatural" animals are notwithstanding a part of the biotic community of Earth, and they would exist able to freely breed and propagate themselves. Yet still they would not exist a office of the current natural ecosystem, they still would not have a natural ecological niche, and many cases of costless-living livestock or pets (feral animals) in many inappropriate locations accept led to irreparable habitat degradation or fifty-fifty ecosystem plummet [28,30].
Many researchers posit the co-evolution of wolves and humans, rather than the one-way domestication of the animal [49]. Both species adapted to working with each other (for the benefit of both) over tens or hundreds of thousands of years. Wolf-homo co-evolution is now suggested to have happened at multiple historical intervals in unlike geographical regions, leading to the rising of an unabridged species (or sub-species), dogs (Dog, or Canis lupus familiaris), and a multitude of breeds [49]. This co-development theory may plausibly explain the domestication procedure of most modern livestock and pets. Novel inquiry also suggests that the co-evolution of humans and many of our domestic species may have been modulated and propagated by the shared feel of bonding, through the ubiquitous neurotransmitter oxytocin [50,51]. While general consensus would not consider zoo-housed animals as domesticated, nosotros must consider that humans have unintentionally started these animals down a like domestication pathway, as we at present approach the tertiary century of keeping animals in zoos, with many convict fauna lineages able to be traced back over 100 years in captivity [12]. This generational captive breeding (including artificial selection of mates) will certainly have profound effects on the prevalent adaptations of these convict animals—adaptations to life in a captive environment and in close proximity with humans. Speculatively, it is possible that close contact with humans may be activating oxytocin pathways in many convict zoo species, leading to positive affiliative (or bonding) man-animal interactions. Indeed, some researchers are starting to focus on reported keeper-animate being bonds in zoos [52,53]. However, 300 years is still a shorter timespan than the domestication procedure for most other animals we keep today (with exception for some farmed species, such as chop-chop "domesticated" mink and foxes), and most animals displayed in zoos still resemble and conduct similar their wild counterparts far more than any newly bred blazon of domesticated animal.
Ane of the core tenets of zoos is to brandish wild animals that have, and will retain, a certain wildness to visitors, not to breed new types of domesticated animals [12]. Therefore, many practices and safeguards are employed by zoos to try to maintain this wildness. However, the efficacy of our attempts to retain wildness may eventually be mooted by uncontrollable selective pressures of generational life in captivity. If zoos exist k years from now, zoo animals may have significantly drifted from true representations of their wild counterparts (many of which will exist extinct in the wild). Just, zoos will nevertheless strive to maintain wildness. And for many animals, zoos' careful management will at to the lowest degree succeed in slowing the charge per unit of domestication, but inevitably some genetic or epigenetic drift (mitochondrial drift), or fifty-fifty morphological migrate, might still occur regardless of our procedures and safeguards. Thus, these convict animals that yet resemble wild species must have specific requirements for intendance and housing that may differ from mutual practices for domesticated animals. This is the care that zoos should, and practice, provide. But zoos must also make many ethical judgements and decisions which will benefit the animal for a full and rich life in captivity, whether wild or domesticated or somewhere in-between.
In that location is significant pressure on zoos to exist to advance both animal welfare and wildlife conservation priorities. Indeed, the Earth Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA) cite conservation as zoos' cadre purpose, but fostering positive animal welfare is their core activity [32]. However, this beast welfare strategy document too quite plainly acknowledges that ofttimes conservation priorities may compromise optimal welfare, but zoos should always effort to minimise welfare-reducing atmospheric condition [32]. A strong priority of zoos is to avoid genetic migrate towards domestication of their convict held wild animals, but, as explained above, at that place is still a risk that fourth dimension will change these animals in unknowable means. This is not written intentionally every bit an inflammatory argument against genetic selection and multifariousness processes utilised by zoos, but merely as an acknowledgement of the inherent entropy of many natural systems, and an acknowledgement that humans do non accept absolute control of natural processes. But, we do our best with the science and applied science that nosotros have available. This ethical wildness dilemma has been explored in context of other arguments, such equally human-controlled facilitated adaptation to climate change impacts [29]. It should besides exist considered that there may be negative impacts of zoos maintaining wildness in their non-releasable captive animals, especially in species known to have low behavioural plasticity [xxx]. For example, some wild animals may be very prone to negative welfare states due to captivity, manifesting in fear or anxiety responses and behavioural patterns [24,30], whereas domesticated or semi-domesticated species (or wild species with high behavioural plasticity) may potentially cope better in captive environments [thirty].
5. (Un)Natural Behaviours
Function of the natural living concept is a focus on allowing animals to express natural behaviours. As has been pointed out by many, still, the definition of natural behaviour is problematic, especially when referring to domesticated species with no natural or wild equivalent fauna, and therefore, no known natural behaviours (for review, see [10]). Once again, wilding runs into problematic territory here, by over-emphasising or reinforcing just those natural behaviours that are more often than not displayed by the species in the wild. Academics have suggested multiple culling terms for natural behaviour that may better define what is intended, such as normal behaviours or species-typical behaviours [ane,10,xviii,34]. All the same, these terms still struggle to clear which behaviours are definitely included every bit natural, and behaviours classified in this way may exist adaptive or maladaptive for a captive surround. For instance, migratory behaviour would be considered normal or typical for a migratory bird species, simply is maladaptive in captivity equally the animal tin not fulfill that motivation [30]. Many behaviours that are displayed by a species in nature have no role or purpose in a convict setting. Just because a natural behaviour is not displayed in captivity does not infer that the animal is in a country of distress or suffering. If a natural behaviour serves no purpose for the animal in its convict environment, the motivation to perform the behaviour may be very low or non-existent [19,23,24,34].
Therefore, more of import measures of welfare-positive behaviours for convict animals are highly-motivated behaviours, and highly-rewarding behaviours. These behaviours may be part of a natural repertoire, or wholly unnatural—only displayed in captivity. So-called unnatural behaviours may be the well-nigh adaptive for the animate being's captive environment, and may exist important for positive affective experiences for that animal. Unnatural behaviours do not fit with the ethos of the concept of natural living or wilding, and attempts may be made to extinguish these behaviours. Nonetheless, this may actually exist of more harm to the beast than benefit—if the behaviour is highly motivated, frustration of that motivation may lead to a negative melancholia country, and possibly a negative welfare country [24]. Restricting an animal's behaviours to merely those which are considered natural may also significantly reduce that animal's ability to make choices (reducing cocky-determined agency), which in plough leads to a perceived lack of control over their situation, which is known to negatively affect coping efforts and welfare of captive animals [31,54,55,56].
Another curiosity of nature is what I will term unexpected natural behaviours. These are behaviours that will exist performed by wild animals in specific unnatural situations, such as interacting with artificial running wheels or mirrors placed in wild environments. Quite a few "popular science" documentaries and online videos bear witness the effects of placing these sorts of objects in nature. Often animals in these videos will run in the artificial wheel, or stare at their reflection for long periods [57]. These are wholly wild animals that are interacting naturally with artificial (unnatural) objects. Following from this, many behaviours in captive animals may be incorrectly classified every bit unnatural, as they are behaviours that are also displayed past wild animals with admission to the same or similar unnatural objects.
To increase well-being and aid positive welfare outcomes for captive animals, focus needs to shift from a fixation on what are considered natural behaviours to those behaviours which the creature appears highly-motivated to perform. Thus, rather than focus on treating animals as though they were wild, it would be more pertinent to focus on assuasive animals to express highly-motivated behaviours, particularly if deprivation or frustration of these behaviours results in significant stress, reduced fettle and/or a negative affective state [24]. Expressing highly-motivated behaviours may as well afford the animals more agency and choice within their environments [54], which should be allowed inside reasonable limits—the allowed behaviours must not compromise the safety or health of the individual performing the behaviours, or of the other animal(s) or man(s) involved (i.e., allowing a predator to hunt for alive prey does non consider the upstanding obligations for the safety of the intended prey animal). This may be categorised into harmless and harmful wants of an creature. Harmless wants may include highly-motivated behaviours such as foraging, climbing, playing or resting. Harmful wants may include highly-motivated behaviours such as feeding, hunting or fighting without restriction. The important factor here is that harmful wants without restriction can lead to harmful consequences (negative, self-injurious or cocky-destructive outcomes) for the individual performing the behaviour, or for individuals that are the target of the behaviours. A classic instance is allowing Labradors access to food ad libitum volition ofttimes result in excessive overeating causing multiple long-term wellness problems, such as obesity and other related conditions. These limits need to be examined carefully and thoroughly, as they will exist very species- and individual-specific behavioural limitations. Many zoos are already doing this, however consensus for an ethical and applied realignment towards promoting highly-motivated behaviours instead of natural behaviours needs to be agreed to and endorsed by zoological institutions, associations, workers and allies.
6. Are Human being-Animal Interactions Natural?
Whether zoos focus on natural behaviours or highly-motivated behaviours, both of these may still include straight interactions with humans. Information technology is oftentimes supposed or assumed that homo-brute interactions in zoos are an unnatural phenomenon, however, there is one articulate style to counter this presumption. In nature, wild animals encounter many other species around them, to which they must accommodate, and frequently interact with, in positive, negative and neutral means (from symbiotic relationships to parasitic or predatory relationships). Near wild animals now have to arrange not only to their historically natural ecosystem conspecifics, just too to a multitude of invasive species that were previously unknown to them or their ancestors [28,30]. Also, every bit we at present live in the Anthropocene era, wild animals increasingly have to accommodate to the always-growing and ever-encroaching homo population, in an increasingly human-affected earth [28,xxx,33]. In captivity, then, are not humans one of those species to adapt to, and to interact with? Humanity oft assumes some removal of our species from the rest of nature, that nosotros are somehow a step apart from other animals. It is doubtful that this is how other animals view humans, withal. Ofttimes one of the groovy curiosities of the natural world is how competing animal species may form symbiotic balances that benefit all, and actively help each other in interactions. These would exist deemed natural behaviours. Therefore, if many species actively interact with other species as a way of adaptation to their environs, would it not follow that homo-animal interactions in zoos could really be considered quite natural adaptations? And if those interactions are highly-motivated in the animal, should nosotros encourage them?
Whether these interactions are deemed natural or unnatural, assuasive for positive human being-animal interactions may be ane avenue of increasing positive melancholia experiences for animals, especially if those animals are highly motivated to interact with humans (whether it be zookeepers or zoo visitors) [39]. These interactions must be subject area to rigorous safety evaluations for all participants, of course. Nonetheless, the current status quo of wilding frameworks often view these interactions as undesirable in any and all situations, regardless of the animate being's motivations behind the intended behaviours. Again, frustration of these motivations may actually exist detracting from an animal's well-being. If an animal is highly motivated to interact with humans in or around its environment, and if those interactions are considered prophylactic for all participants, then those interactions should be immune to occur, or even promoted (through supervised offerings of such interactions). Plain some interactions are exempt from these stipulations, when because an animate being's overall wellness or all-time interests (such equally veterinary procedures or restraint for medical treatment), though positive reinforcement preparation schedules can often remove some of the harshest penalties to the animals these situation might present (such as training for quick, mildly-aversive hand-injections, blood sampling, or "crate grooming" for restraint and transport) [37,58].
An animal's motivation to engage in positive human-interactions may vary from twenty-four hour period-to-day, based on other internal and external factors, merely the animal should never be confined to, or negatively coerced into, an interaction scenario. The selection to interact should always be on an animal'south own terms. This may not be the case for all man-animal interactions currently deployed by zoos across the world. Frequently, many "come across" or "interaction" animals are not afforded a choice of whether to participate or not, or are housed in inadequate areas that may increase their desire to escape that expanse, even if information technology ways having to interact when they are unwilling [59,sixty]. Most industry-accredited zoos have their ain welfare lease, and accept processes and policies implemented to safeguard encounter creature well-being, and to attempt to offer equally much option as possible to the animals earlier being handled for interactions. Indeed, the guidelines published by WAZA [32] state that: "Interactive experiences should be non-invasive, rubber and non-stressful for animals. Monitoring of all animals involved in interactions must be ongoing and take professional oversight. Risks to animal welfare should be minimised by carefully considering whether interactive experiences are appropriate, and if they are, by accommodating the animals' detail needs" (p. 74).
7. Conclusions
Natural living may be a useful concept for developing robust measures of holistic zoo brute welfare, but care must be taken to avoid the pitfalls and dilemmas explored in this commodity. Specifically, wilding is a concept that may not truly exist providing zoo personnel with an appropriate upstanding or conceptual footing for optimizing evidence-based animal welfare. Zoos will proceed existing well into the time to come, and and so more than advisable measures of what is important to an animal for a "life worth living" in captivity should tend towards highly-motivated behaviours rather than simply natural behaviours. Human being-beast interactions in zoos are a source of contend and controversy, however, if implemented appropriately, they may significantly enhance brute well-being and holistic creature welfare (which may still exist distinctly different concepts, even though the words are now frequently used interchangeably [10]), every bit they are often relationships of great importance to convict animals. Further exploration of what might constitute positive human being-animal interactions, both scientifically and ethically, as well every bit ways of implementing such interactions without leading to unintended or "undesirable" human behavioural patterns emerging (such as an increased want to "own" exotic wildlife) shall exist forthcoming every bit a follow-upwardly to this commodity.
Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge the immense assist of Peter Sandøe in testing and tempering the ethical arguments presented within. Cheers, Peter. The author besides wishes to thank Paul Hemsworth, Emerge Sherwen and Jenny Gray for their critique, comments and guidance. This paper represents an ethical chapter of a broader ethical and experimental PhD thesis conducted through the University of Melbourne, Commonwealth of australia.
Funding
This research was supported by an Australian Government Inquiry Training Program (RTP) Scholarship.
Conflicts of Interest
The author declares no conflict of interest.
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